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Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on specific deterrence by addressing the issue 
of selecting adolescents into adult and juvenile law systems. In Germany, different from the 
U.S. and most other countries, turning a critical cutoff age does not cause a sharp 
discontinuity from juvenile to adult penal law, but rather implies a shift to a discretionary 
system of both adult and juvenile law, dependent on the courts’ impression of moral and 
mental personal development of the adolescent at the time of the act. The German legal 
system draws the line of adulthood at some fuzzy age interval between 18 and 21, which is 
well above the thresholds prevailing in the U.S. (16 to 18 years, state specific) and other 
countries such that the German evidence entails some external evidence to the previous 
literature mostly relying on U.S. data. Based on a unique inmate survey and two-equation 
models controlling for selectivity problems, results show that application of adult criminal law 
instead of juvenile penal law decreases expected recidivism of adolescents.  
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1 Introduction 
 
There is an ongoing debate on the appropriate way of punishing adolescent offenders. In the 
U.S., in response to increasing violence of minors during the 1990s, nearly all states moved to 
ease the process of transferring serious juvenile offenders to the adult criminal justice system 
(Myers 2003, Bishop 2000). The criminal policy of other nations is more reluctant in applying 
the harsher adult criminal law to young criminals. Based on the literature on personal 
development, opponents of the “get tough” movement argue that it seems to be more 
beneficial to put them back on the "right track" by using educational and disciplinary 
measures, as youths are generally more inclined towards criminal activity (e. g. Heinz 2004, 
Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber 2004), which can be explained by a contemporary maturity 
gap (Moffitt 1993). This leads to the belief that juveniles are more rehabilitable and less 
culpable than adults (Mears, Hay, Gertz, and Mancini 2007). However, recent developments 
showing an increasing number of highly aggressive and serious acts of violence committed by 
minors question the ruling criminal policy (see Aebi 2004, Oberwittler and Hoefer 2005). In 
Germany, the ongoing media coverage of violent crimes resulted in a strong pressure on 
politics (Bundestag 2009) to touch upon the question on how to deal with juvenile and 
adolescent offenders. 
A major drawback of the existing empirical studies is the strong limitation to U.S. data, 
because U.S. courts treat individuals as adults already at an early age. 47 states use 17 or 18 as 
the age at which most minors are treated as adults (Rosch et al. 2007). North Carolina, 
Connecticut and New York draw the line of adulthood for criminal culpability even at the age 
of 16. Hence, most research on specific deterrence is based on transferring 16- and 17-year-
olds to adult criminal courts such that the validity on the deterrence hypothesis is limited to 
younger age groups. The German criminal law system provides some interesting alternative 
institutional framework (see Dünkel, 2005, for historical, institutional and both adult and 
juvenile law details). Unlike the U.S. system and other European countries, all individuals 
below 18 are strictly treated under juvenile penal law. Turning 18 does not automatically lead 
to the application of adult criminal law. Young adults, considered and defined as ‘adolescents’ 
(‘Heranwachsende’) in terms of the law (18 to under 21 years of age), might be treated the 
same as juveniles (14 to 18 years old). Whether adolescents were acting ‘[…] equal to a 
juvenile regarding moral and mental development at the time of the act’ in the sense of § 105 
of the German Juvenile Justice Act (‘Jugendgerichtsgesetz’, JGG) or not depends on the 
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discretionary margin of prosecutors and judges.2 Similar regulations exist in some other 
European countries such as Austria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (Dünkel 
2005). 3     
This paper contributes to the literature on specific deterrence by addressing the issue of 
selecting adolescents into adult and juvenile law systems. In particular, we focus on prison 
inmates belonging to the discretionary ‘adolescent’ group (18 to under 21 years of age) and 
compare expected recidivism of those convicted under adult criminal law to recidivism of 
those treated as juveniles. This setting provides new evidence because the design is different 
from the U.S. paradigm prevailing in the literature. Results are also of related interest for 
public policy, in particular in Europe, as the German model is used as a fighting crime 
strategy in other countries.  
The data is based on a unique survey on 31 German prisons (German Inmate Survey, see 
Entorf et al., 2008, Entorf 2009). The econometric approach applies recursive two-equation 
models (bivariate probit, treatment regressions) which distinguish between a selection 
equation (selecting individuals to either the adult or the juvenile law) and a treatment 
equation. The latter captures the causal effect of interest, i.e. the impact of adult treatment on 
expected recidivism.  
Contrary to the bulk of results based on U.S. data found in the criminological literature, 
results indicate that application of harsher adult criminal laws decreases the expected 
recidivism of adolescents.  
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a short review of related literature. In 
Chapter 3, a description of the data is provided. Methods and identification strategy are 
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 informs about econometric results. Chapter 6 gives a short 
summary and concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
2 Note that all cases of young adults (<21) are transferred to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts who decide on 
application of adult or juvenile law. 
3 In most European countries, the age of full criminal responsibility is below 21. For instance, application of 
adult law at the age of 18 is mandatory in Denmark, England/Wales, Finland, France, Sweden and Norway 
(Dünkel 2005).  
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2 Previous Research 
 
Research addresses the role of “specific deterrence” and “general deterrence” on future 
criminal behavior. Rational choice models (Becker 1968) of general deterrence predict that 
increasing severity and certainty of expected punishments should lead to a decline in crime. 
Hence, the threat of harsher “adult punishments” will give adolescents pause before they 
continue committing crimes. Put differently, adolescents have little incentive to curb criminal 
behavior if they can expect to be treated under the more lenient juvenile law. Evidence in 
favor of the general deterrence theory was given by Levitt (1998), who showed that the 
greater the difference between the stricter adult system and the lenient juvenile system, the 
more the crime rate declined when an increasing number of juveniles were transferred to adult 
criminal courts. In a more recent paper, Lee and McCrary (2009) found evidence that young 
adults did hardly respond to the harsher adult law when turning 18, a result that contradicts 
Levitt’s (1998) findings who showed that there is less crime when adolescents pass into the 
adult system. In line with the majority of criminologists (see Redding 2003, and Fagan2008, 
for surveys), Lee and McCrary (2009) argue that those young offenders can be characterized 
as myopic, who are unfazed by the threat of short prison sentences and discount the 
consequences and likelihood of longer imprisonments.  
Research on specific deterrence concerns the pros and cons of applying harsher punishment 
on adolescent offenders in order to reduce the likelihood of future reoffending. Fagan (2008) 
summarizes the recent criminological literature which is mostly based on U.S. data. The 
studies typically compare court outcomes and recidivism rates for matched groups of 
transferred and retained youths. According to his survey, research on transfer of juveniles to 
adult criminal courts suggests that recidivism rates are either the same or significantly higher 
for transferred youths than for youths retained in the juvenile court. Some studies comparethe 
criminal records of similar groups of youths either for the same time period or for different 
time periods before and after law changes. However, as pointed out by Fagan (2008), most of 
the studies introduce selection biases that prevent a true comparison of individuals with and 
without the ‘adult’ treatment. A major problem is that many studies do not control for pre-
existing indices for criminal propensity that may then affect the outcomes. Hence, differences 
in the recidivism rates of both samples may reflect more about such pre-existing propensities 
than about the differential treatment effects. However, some few studies address these 
selection issues. Winner et al. (1997) matched cases in the juvenile and adult courts on seven 
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criteria.4 Lanza-Kaduce, Lane, Bishop, and Frazier (2005) used propensity scores 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984) to adjust for selection effects in the transfer process.  The 
differences in recidivism rates using this strategy show substantially higher recidivism rates 
for transferred youth. Applying the same method, their result is confirmed by Fagan et al. 
(2004) who compared recidivism rates among samples of youths recruited from New York 
City whose cases originated in the criminal court, with samples from bordering areas in 
northeastern New Jersey whose cases were processed in the juvenile court. Further studies by 
Myers (2003), Podkopacz and Feld (1995), and Thornberry, Huizinga and Loeber (2004) 
come to the same conclusion. 
Hjalmarsson (2009) used a different approach for testing the specific deterrence hypothesis. 
Contrary to the bulk of research, she is testing the deterrence effect of juvenile facilities when 
the alternative would be sentencing without incarceration (i.e. probation or fine). Applying a 
regression discontinuity design that is based on sentencing either to custody or to more lenient 
measures depending on binding guidelines (“sentencing grid”) for Washington state juvenile 
courts, she identifies the causal effect by comparing the recidivism rate of individuals who are 
close to the critical sentencing grid on either side of the cutoff, i.e. juveniles without 
incarceration on the one side of the grid and juveniles with incarceration on the other side of 
the grid. Her study shows that incarceration in juvenile facilities can be an effective measure 
of combating juvenile crime.  
A major drawback of the existing empirical studies is the limitation to U.S. data such that 
most research on specific deterrence is based on transferring 16- and 17-year-olds to adult 
criminal courts. As outlined in the Introduction, depending on the severity of the crime and 
the maturity of the defendant, adolescent delinquents can be sentenced according to either 
juvenile or criminal law. There is no special court for juveniles. Inspecting recidivism rates 
for those who are convicted either under juvenile law or under criminal law in Germany and 
released when they were between 18 and 24 years old, it turns out that recidivism rates are 
higher for those who are treated as juveniles.5 Of course, apart from age this comparison 
                                                 
 
4 However, besides information on prior offenses, data on the individual background is rather limited: only age at 
the time of committing the offense, gender and race are considered.   
5  Jehle, Heinz and Sutterer (2003) analysed official register data on recidivism within a four years period (1994 
to 1998). The recidivism rate after being released from an unconditional prison sentence under juvenile law was 
79.0% for 18-to-20-year-olds and 74.9% for 21-to-24-year-olds (Jehle et al. 2003, p. 109). Respective recidivism 
rates after unconditional prison sentences under adult criminal law were 46.2% (18 to 20 years of age) and 
49.9% (21 to 24 ) (Jehle et al. 2003, p. 107).  Aggregating over all age groups, the recidivism rate within four 
years after unconditional prison sentence under juvenile law was 77.8%, whereas it was 54.9% for adults. 
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might still be biased by selection due to other factors such as education, family background or 
labor market prospects (Entorf 2009).  
 
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
This analysis is based on a prison survey of 1,771 German inmates. The survey (German 
Inmate Survey, Entorf et al., 2008) uses a two-stage approach that combines stratified and 
random sampling. First, a representative sample of the population of prisons in Germany was 
created. Second, a random draw out of this population completed the sampling. 
The survey data was collected in 31 German prisons in 2003 and 2004 using a questionnaire 
with 123 questions. In order to account for the different nationalities of the inmates, the 
questionnaire was distributed in either German, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, Russian, Polish or 
English language. The survey was organized and performed by a team of researchers from 
Darmstadt University of Technology. It was first analyzed by Entorf (2009).6 
The convicts of the dataset can be grouped into three subsamples: inmates in pretrial custody, 
inmates sentenced under juvenile law and inmates sentenced under criminal law. Since this 
study focuses on the effect of the applied law type, only the last two subgroups are used and 
inmates in pretrial custody are dropped. Furthermore, as the main research interest is on 
juveniles and young adults, only individuals aged between 15 and 22 when they committed 
the crime are considered relevant for the analysis. This results in a subsample of 159 inmates. 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. 
The crucial variable of interest is expected recidivism. It is constructed from the response to 
the following survey question: 
(1) Could it occur that after your release from custody you come into conflict with the law and end up in 
prison?  
Tick your assessment on the following 5-point scale, whereby a 1 stands for “no, never”, and a 5 stands for   
“absolutely certain”:  
   Absolutely certain 
 No, never                                                                              I’ll be in again 
 O O O O O 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 Interviews with judicial employees suggest an overrepresentation of the more active group of inmates. 
However, when comparing the sample characteristics to those of the average prison population in Germany, 
there no evidence of a selection bias was found (see Entorf et al. 2008).  
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Answers to this question are transformed into a binary variable expected recidivism. Given the 
ordered categories of the survey question, ordered discrete choice models would have been 
the natural alternative to the performed binary response model. The reason for summarizing 
categories is the rather small number of 159 observations in the age-at-offense group of 
interest. Summarizing categories prevents misinterpretations of subjective survey questions 
and avoids problems arising from sparsely filling in certain survey categories, in particular 
due to the often found rare use of extreme survey categories. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Conditional on age at offence   (15, 22] 
Variable  Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
recidivism (expectation) 159 .2893082 .4548739 0 1 
age at offense 159 18.9908 1.870697 15.25 22 
age 159 21.18868 2.679434 16 29 
male 159 .9308176 .2545658 0 1 
married 159 .081761 .274866 0 1 
poor social capital 159 .4842767 .5013317 0 1 
no church  159 .3396226 .4750775 0 1 
criminal family background 159 .2201258 .4156404 0 1 
Abitur 159 .0503145 .2192837 0 1 
addiction (alcohol or drugs) 159 .2893082 .4548739 0 1 
job contact 159 .1949686 .3974282 0 1 
schooling 159 9.836478 2.102212 2 17 
length (of prison sentence)  157 3.167994 2.641088 .167 15 
(application of) criminal law 159 .3018868 .4605269 0 1 
murder 159 .1194969 .3253971 0 1 
sexual offence 159 .0503145 .2192837 0 1 
assault 159 .3144654 .4657696 0 1 
robbery 159 .3117647 .4645827 0 1 
theft 159 .4150943 .4942951 0 1 
fraud 159 .1823899 .3873857 0 1 
illicit drugs: consumption 159 .0754717 .2649855 0 1 
illicit drugs: dealing 159 .1383648 .3463734 0 1 
vandalism 159 .1194969 .3253971 0 1 
Note: descriptive statistics under the restriction that variables show valid observations on ‘recidivism’; Data 
Source:  German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al. 2008).  
 
In the data, the answers are positively skewed: 43.5% of the respondents answered with the 
lower extreme “No, never” while only 4% said they were absolutely certain to reoffend. 
Therefore, we set expected recidivism to zero if the respondent chose either answer 1 or 2, 
and set the binary variable to one for those with a higher self-reported probability of ending 
up in prison again (answers 3-5). 
One might raise objections against using perceived expected recidivism as a proxy for real 
recidivism and actual criminal behavior. However, there are at least three arguments in favor 
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of self-assessments. First, there is evidence that expected and real recidivism are correlated 
(see for instance Corrado 2003, Lochner 2007). Second, using expected recidivism in contrast 
to actual recidivismavoids the problem of a selection bias which arises when conducting 
follow-up surveys collecting information on realized recidivism. Third, when studying joint 
distributions of expected recidivism and related covariates researchers do not have to rely 
solely on unconditional recidivism rates (without any meaningful background information 
such as socioeconomic or family situations) as they can be found in most recidivism surveys 
(as in Jehle et al. 2003, for German recidivism rates).  
The crucial variable for the assigned type of law is the age at the time when the crime was 
committed (‘age at offense’). Since this information did not appear directly in the survey, it is 
constructed by using time and age when inmates were interviewed and the time when the 
crime was committed. With regard to the latter, inmates could choose to indicate either a point 
in time or an interval. In the case of a point in time, the calculation is straightforward. When 
dealing with an interval, it is not very clear which point in time to take. For these cases, we 
took the upper bound of the interval, since German juvenile law (Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG) 
allows judges to apply adult criminal law once the delinquent has reached the critical age 
when committing his criminal acts (§ 32 JGG).  
Table 2 informs about expected recidivism of juveniles (age at offense < 18) dependent on 
age (at the time of the interview). Young offenders who committed their crimes when they 
were younger than 18 seem to be very pessimistic when still young (below 18): Here, 
expected recidivism is 0.5 which is clearly above the average rate of 0.29. Older cohorts 
originating with the same age at offense show less pessimistic assessments of their future, and 
after a couple of years (age   21 ) they even seem to respond in a rather optimistic way 
(0.14), although this evidence cannot be generalized because it is based on only 7 
observations.  
Table 2: Expected Recidivism of Juveniles (age at offense < 18)  
Age (at time of survey) 
<18 [18, 21)   21 
   
0.50 (8) 0.29 (41) 0.14 (7) 
Notes: Share of inmates with “expected recidivism = 1” whose age at the time of the offense was below 18; 
number of respondents in parentheses. Data: German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al., 2008). 
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The age group [18,21) is of particular importance because for criminals of this age German 
judges decide about application of either criminal or juvenile law (JGG). Table 3 considers 
expected recidivism of the age-of-offense group [18,21), and it distinguishes between those 
who are convicted under juvenile law and those who are sentenced under adult conditions. 
Preliminary descriptive evidence suggests that those convicted under juvenile law expect 
markedly higher rates of recidivism, conditional on the age at the time of the interview. 
Ignoring age, the average recidivism rate of ‘juveniles’ would only be slightly higher than that 
of ‘adults’ (0.34 compared to 0.31). 
Table 3: Expected Recidivism of Adolescent Offenders  
 Age at time of offense (related to present prison sentence) = 
  [18, 21) 
Age (at time of 
interview) 
Application of juvenile penal 
law 
Application of (adult) criminal 
law 
[18, 21) 0.35 (20) 0.00 (1) 
[21, 23) 0.29 (31) 0.25 (8) 
  23 0.60 (5) 0.35 (17) 
Average (all age groups) 0.34 (56) 0.31 (26) 
Notes: Share of inmates with “expected recidivism = 1” whose age at the time of the offense was at least 18 but 
under 21 years of age; number of respondents in parentheses. Data: German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al. 2008). 
Of course, age and maturity of young criminals are important factors of recidivism, but many 
other covariates are of similar relevance. One of these variables is gender (male). Consistent 
with national criminal survey statistics, there is a strong majority (90%) of male inmates in 
our sample. We also control for marital status (married). In our sample, only 8.2% are 
married, which is probably due to the fact that we are looking at inmates aged 15 to 22 when 
committing the crime. Further, we measure participation in social clubs, e. g. sports clubs or 
the voluntary fire brigade, mapping the lack of active participation into the dummy variable 
poor social capital. Almost half of the inmates in question (48.4%) reported no active 
participation in social clubs. Furthermore, religious affiliation might play an important role in 
terms of beliefs and intrinsic motivation. The corresponding dummy variable no church is set 
to one for all inmates that do not belong to any religion which holds true for 33.9% in our 
sample.  
Crime and education are often found to be negatively correlated. This study includes 
education measured as the number of years spent in school (schooling).  As education is a 
positive asset in the legal labor market, it should reduce the probability to reoffend. However, 
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education might also be of importance to judges who have to decide to what extend suspects 
are fully responsible for their behavior or whether individual maturity is lagging behind. Poor 
or high educational levels of adolescents might help judges in making her or his decision 
about which penal law to choose. Abitur measures the educational degree which is usually 
achieved after 18 or 19 years of age; it qualifies for university entrance in Germany. For the 
relevant subgroup of inmates with age at offense between 18 and 21 years the ratio is 5.3%. 
(full sample: 5.0%, see Table 1).  
Recidivism heavily depends on future legal perspectives. Labor market opportunities play a 
leading role. The analysis includes the binary variable job contact which is set to one for all 
inmates reporting to have a job opportunity when leaving jail which is the case for 19.5% of 
the relevant inmates.7  Recidivism is likewise linked to alcohol and drug addiction, both in a 
direct way – in the sense that addicted people might more easily commit crimes under the 
influence of drugs – and in an indirect way in the sense that these people might see criminal 
behavior as a way to finance their habits (see for instance Entorf & Winker 2008, Goldstein 
1985 or Harrison 1992). In the sample, 30.2% of the inmates suffer from at least one of these 
addictions. Furthermore, criminal family background could matter for expected recidivism. 
This dummy variable captures past convictions of parents or siblings and applies for 22% of 
the inmates in the sample.  
Finally, the survey contains detailed information on the crime committed and the 
corresponding sanction. Many delinquents have a criminal record of different offences 
resulting in multiple crime types being reported by a single individual. The most frequently 
reported crime is theft (41.5%), followed by assault (31.4%) and robbery (31.2%).  
In terms of applied legislation, 30.2% of all delinquents in the sample were sanctioned under 
adult criminal law. For the important subsample of those who committed their crime between 
18 and 21 years of age, this share is 28.2% (Table A3, Appendix). We also observe the length 
of a prison sentence measured in years. In line with German legislation, lifelong punishments 
(recorded as ‘lifelong’ in the data) are recoded as a 15 year sentence, which is also the 
maximum custody length found in the sample.  
As mentioned above, depending on age at offense different laws might apply. Delinquents can 
thus be grouped into three groups. Juveniles can only be sentenced according to juvenile law 
(Table A2, 55 observations), adolescents can be penalized by either juvenile or criminal law 
                                                 
 
7 See Entorf (2009) for a discussion of the influences of school and job market opportunities on criminal 
behavior and recidivism. 
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(Table A3, 78 observations) and adults who have to be sentenced under criminal law (Table 
A4, 26 observations). Thus, to sharpen the contrast between juvenile law and adult law, the 
sample of the fuzzy age-at-offence group [18,21) is enhanced by criminals of similar age 
either strictly subject to adult or strictly subject to juvenile law. Subsequent econometric 
results will be based on both samples, i.e. age at offence (15,22] and [18,21). 
A comparison of the three groups reveals some significant differences at the descriptive 
level.8 There are only male juveniles and more than 93.6% male adolescents while we have 
23.1% female adult offenders in our sample, representing a statistically significant drop. As 
expected, there is a statistically significant rise in the share of married respondents when 
moving from juvenile to adolescent offenders. Furthermore, the years of schooling increase in 
age yielding a significant difference between juveniles and adolescents.  
In addition, there are further notable but non-significant differences between groups. The rate 
of recidivism seems to be similar in the first two groups (approx. 30%) but lower for the 
group of adults (18%). Also, job contacts decrease with age which seems to indicate that 
inmates have a harder time to reenter the legal job market when getting older. We find 
sentence length to increase with age, which seems natural because adult persons get more 
severe sentences. In terms of crime types we see that almost all crimes become less frequent 
as the age increases. Especially interesting is vandalism, which does not show up at all for 
adult (>21) delinquents. The only crimes that are increasing with age are fraud, sexual 
offences, drug dealing and drug consumption.  However, as for all differences described in 
this paragraph, the change between the groups is not significant. 
 
4 Legal Background and Econometric Identification Strategy 
 
The main goal of this study is to focus on young adults (‘adolescents’) who were at least 18 
years of age when they committed their offences and to compare the expected recidivism of 
those who are sentenced under adult criminal law (‘Strafgesetzbuch’, StGB) to the one of 
adolescents sentenced under juvenile penal law (‘Jugendgerichtsgesetz’, JGG). According to 
German legislation, juvenile law is mandatory for all delinquents aged less than 18 when 
committing the crime. For offenders of at least 18 but less than 21 years of age at offense, the 
legislator (§ 105 JGG, Jugendgerichtsgesetz) left the decision to the (juvenile) courts whether 
                                                 
 
8 In terms of the difference of two sample means we consider them as statistically significantly different from 
each other using a two sample t test if the significance of their difference is higher than 10%. 
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to apply juvenile or criminal law. Finally, delinquents of at least 21 years have to be 
sentenced under general criminal law. With regard to the treatment assignment function, 
German legislation specifies that criminal law should be applied whenever the adolescent 
offender does not appear to be similar to a juvenile, neither in terms of personal development 
nor in the type of crime committed. Using these maturity criteria, judges of adolescents of the 
age-at-offense group [18, 21) have to evaluate which law to apply. It is quite obvious that the 
judge’s decision will hinge on observables (like age) but also on unobservables (like maturity) 
which, however, likewise determine expected recidivism. Thus, when evaluating the 
recidivism rate of both penal law regimes, there is a potential endogeneity problem and the 
treatment effect cannot be estimated by simply inspecting sign and magnitude of treatment 
dummy variables. 
Figure 1: Estimated Probability of Applying Adult Criminal Law 
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Note: Local Polynomial Regression, incl. 95% confidence interval; Data: See Table 1. 
The first idea was to tackle the endogeneity problem by using the regression discontinuity 
design (see Imbens and Lemieux 2008, and Van der Klaauw 2008, for surveys), and by 
inspecting recidivism rates just before and after turning 18. However, the propensity score is 
almost zero until ‘age at offense’ equals 19 years of age at the time of committing the offense, 
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as can be seen from Figure 1.9 Thus, RD does not work smoothly, neither in a sharp nor a 
fuzzy framework, when the legislative cut-off point ‘age at offense=18’ is not effective, even 
not at some closer neighbourhood. Entorf et al. (2010) experimented with different alternative 
cut-off points at age at offense > 18 which, however, clearly bears the major problem of 
considerable arbitrariness.  
In order to transfer the legal restrictions into a statistical model, the framework has to deal 
with the problem that turning 18 entails a change from definite application of juvenile penal 
law (applied to all minors under 18 years of age) to a different ‘fuzzy’ law status. The fact that 
juveniles turn 18 might already entail some deterrent effect on its own, irrespective of being 
treated as juvenile or adult. At the same time, turning 18 implies a second (nested) and 
potentially more severe shift from juvenile law to adult criminal law, given the person is 
convicted accordingly. Thus, the equation of interest on expected recidivism should provide 
information on the effect of both cutoffs, i.e. ‘being at least 18 years of age or older at the 
time of committing the offence’ and ‘being at least 18 years of age at the time of committing 
the offence and  being convicted under criminal law’. An equation that accounts for both 
effects on expected recidivism of inmate i (in prison j) is 
(1)    1 2i i i i iER z D T       , 
where 1iD   if the person was at least 18 years old at the time of the offence (0 otherwise), 
and where the treatment 1i i iT D A   indicates application of the adult criminal law with 
1iA   representing adult criminal law, 0iA    juvenile penal law.  
Equation (1) includes a vector of explanatory factors iz  and a residual i . The latter might 
include some prison specific influences which are taken into account by correcting for 
unobserved clustering effects. Obviously, the interpretation of the treatment effect 2 would be 
limited when we estimated eq. (1) by ordinary least squares because of the selection problem 
outlined before: Young inmates who committed their crimes when they were above the 
critical age of 18 (but still younger than 21) are committed under ‘adult’ conditions for good 
reasons, which might include some more serious criminal backgrounds, advanced criminal 
careers and a higher risk of recidivism (when convicted as juvenile). Thus, treatment as an 
                                                 
 
9 Actually, for those inmates who are treated under adult conditions the youngest age at the time of committing 
the offence found in the survey is 19. The local polynomial regression (using optimized bandwidths) provides 
smooth transitions from zero to non-zero probabilities. 
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adult, iT , should be considered as endogenous, depending on correlated and common factors 
which motivate courts treating young adults under (adult) criminal law: 
(2)  * ,i i iT x e        where 
*1 0
and    ( , | , ) .
0    
i
i i i
if T
T cor e z x r
otherwise
  
 
Under the hypothesis that being treated as adult or not depends on both observable and 
unobservable factors covering the propensity for continuing the criminal behavior, it is 
assumed that unobserved factors which cause judges to rule under adult law lead to higher 
recidivism of convicted offenders: Thus, ( , )i icor e r   is expected to be positive. 
The econometric problem is that both recidivism in eq. (1) and the potentially endogenous 
‘adult’ treatment in eq. (2) are binary variables. A straightforward approach would be to 
estimate eq. (1) by applying a two-stage probit procedure (à la 2SLS), i.e. first run a probit of 
T on all exogenous variables and get the fitted probability ˆ , then run probit on ,z D  and ˆ . 
However, as pointed out in the literature (see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, lecture 6, 
Angrist and Pischke 2009, Chapter 4) estimating these so called “forbidden regressions” does 
not work because it would require passing the expected value through a nonlinear function. 
As there are no known two-step methods that allow one to estimate probit models with 
discrete endogenous variables, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, lecture 6, p. 28) advocate the 
use of bivariate probit models with binary endogenous explanatory variables. Accordingly, a 
bivariate probit model in the tradition of Maddala (1983, p.123) will be estimated (it is called 
a ‘recursive, bivariate probit model’ by Greene and Henscher 2010, p. 90): 
(3)     
2 1 2
( 1| ) ( )
( 1, 1| , , , ) ( , , ).
P T x x
P ER T z D T x z D T x r

   
  
        
Note that the endogenous nature of T on the right-hand side variable of the second equation 
can be ignored in nonlinear maximum likelihood estimations (see, e.g., Greene 2008, p 823, 
Imbens and Wooldridge, lecture 6, p. 28).  Another advantage of the bivariate probit model 
compared to the linear case is that there is no exclusion restriction required for identification: 
exogenous variables may appear in both equations (Greene and Hensher, 2010, p. 91).  The 
only restriction is that there needs to be at least one exclusion restriction in the bivariate probit 
first stage (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 199). 
Primary interest is in the consistent estimation of the parameter 2  (and not in estimating 
endogenous probabilities of recidivism) such that treatment-effects models can be considered 
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as alternative estimation strategy. They test the effect of an endogenously chosen binary 
treatment on another endogenous continuous variable, conditional on two sets of independent 
variables. Thus, unlike in bivariate probit models, endogenous expected recidivism will be 
estimated within a linear probability model.10  Details are outlined in Maddala (1983, 117-
122) and Greene (2008, p. 889-890). The model makes use of Heckman’s (1979) correction 
approach (for endogeneity, not selection) such that the expected rate of recidivism for those 
treated under adult criminal law can be estimated using the inverse Mills ratio:   
(4)   
1 2
1 2
( | 1, , ) ( | )
( )
                                z
( )
i i i i i i i i
i
i
i
E ER T x z z E e x
x
r
x
    
     
      
    
. 
The respective rate for those treated under juvenile law is 
(5)   
1
1
( | 0, , ) ( | )
( )
                                z
1 ( )
i i i i i i i i
i
i
i
E ER T x z z E e x
x
r
x
   
    
     
      
 . 
Identification of the causal treatment effect of interest, 2 , requires that exogenous factors of 
selectivity are included in ix  and to have variables in iz that are not included in ix . This 
exclusion restriction will be satisfied in the subsequent analysis. As already discussed in the 
previous section, courts consider age as a major factor influencing their decision. Moreover, 
types of crime and indicators of maturity will be used as explanatory variables in the 
selectivity equation. Individual labor market opportunities, social capital as well as alcohol 
and illicit drug problems serve as main factors iz of recidivism in the equation of interest. 
 
5 Results 
 
Table 4 presents results for the bivariate probit and treatment-effects models outlined above.  
Both frameworks combine the equation of interest (estimating the causal effect of the adult 
criminal law treatment) with a second equation which maps decisions of courts. They select 
adolescents/young adults either to the adult or the juvenile regime. All results are based on 
maximum-likelihood estimations (or, as argued in Huber 1967, and White 1982, on quasi-
                                                 
 
10 Angrist (2001) promote just using linear probability models estimated by 2SLS. The Heckman-two step model 
can be interpreted as a related control function approach. For conditions leading to equivalence of 2SLS and 
control functions see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, lecture 6).  
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maximum-likelihood if the distributional assumptions are not fully correct). The calculation 
of standard errors considers potential effects arising from stratification and clustering (in 
prisons). The sample is restricted to young prison inmates, because the focus of the study is 
on the distinction between juvenile law applied to defendants younger than 18 years of age 
and a case-based discretionary law applied to adolescents between 18 and 21 years of age. 
Empirical evidence relies on two nested age groups. The first one includes inmates of 
neighbouring age groups whose age at the time of the offense was between 15 and 22, the 
second one is strictly limited to the group of 18 to 21 years of (offender) age.  
Before turning to the results of two-equation models in more detail, some general 
observations can be reported. As endorsed by estimated single-equation probit models (Table 
4 column (1)) and subsequent two-equation models, expected recidivism is higher for those 
with criminal family background (i.e. parents or sisters have a criminal record), drug or 
alcohol addiction and for inmates with poor social capital. Recidivism seems to be less likely 
when a job contact or more years of schooling lead to more optimistic labor market 
perspectives. These results confirm previous probit results based on all survey inmates (1,568 
observations) presented in Entorf (2009). The only exception is that social capital was not 
significant in the full sample whereas it is in the subsample. The strong and highly significant 
effect throughout all specifications for the young cohort shows that lack of social capital is 
particularly hazardous for juvenile and adolescent individuals.  
Some variables were found insignificant for expected recidivism in column (1) (Table 4) as 
well as in more complex two-equation models such that they were disregarded in further 
models of Table 4. These are no church (indicates whether the minor is a member of a 
protestant, catholic, islamic, etc. church or not), male and age at offense. The insignificance of 
gender (found throughout all models) is somewhat surprising as results based on the full 
sample (Entorf 2009) suggest markedly more optimistic future perspectives for females. 
There might be two explanations for the less optimistic prospects of the young female prison 
cohort under consideration. The first one is that adolescent females in prisons represent an 
adverse selection, even regarding the universe of all females and young males in prison, 
possibly because judges apply the ultima ratio of unconditional imprisonment for young 
females in a more conservative way than they do for young males or more mature females. 
The second explanation is that there is convergence of female and male behavior or attitudes 
such that assessments made by young female cohorts cannot be distinguished any more from 
those made by their male counterparts. 
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Table 4: Econometric Estimation of Two-equation Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected Recidivism 
 
(1) 
Single 
Probit 
15<x ≤22 
Part I of two-equation models 
(2) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
15<x ≤22 
(3) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
15<x ≤22 
(4) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
18<x ≤21 
(5) 
Treatment 
Regression 
15<x ≤22 
(6) 
Treatment 
Regression 
18<x ≤21 
1( 18) ( )D x 
   
0.650 
(0.378) 
0.414*** 
(0.150) 
0.384** 
(0.145) 
_ 0.121** 
(0.052) 
_ 
2( ) ( )T adult 
 
-0.576 
(0.644) 
-1.573** 
(0.731) 
-1.487** 
(0.661) 
-1.604** 
(0.612) 
-0.459** 
(0.207) 
-0.530* 
(0.253) 
Drug or alcohol 
addiction 
0.477** 
(0.199) 
0.371* 
(0.197) 
0.410* 
(0.207) 
0.617* 
(0.309) 
0.144* 
(0.071) 
0.207* 
(0.113) 
Criminal family 
background 
0.495** 
(0.188) 
0.465** 
(0.172) 
0.422** 
(0.191) 
0.578** 
(0.272) 
0.146** 
(0.059) 
0.168 
(0.105) 
Job contact -0.341* 
(0.174) 
-0.460*** 
(0.133) 
-0.386*** 
(0.127) 
-0.643 
(0.428) 
-0.108*** 
(0.033) 
-0.146 
(0.106) 
Poor social 
capital 
0.554*** 
(0.166) 
0.635*** 
(0.175) 
0.566*** 
(0.176) 
0.802*** 
(0.267) 
0.166*** 
(0.054) 
0.197*** 
(0.057) 
No church  0.110 
(0.147) 
0.101 
(0.132) 
_ _ _ _ 
Male -0.058 
(0.398) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
Schooling -0.102* 
(0.054) 
-0.089* 
(0.051) 
-0.089* 
(0.048) 
-0.156* 
(0.078) 
_ _ 
Age  < 18 -0.600 
(0.717) 
-0.471 
(0.622) 
-0.453 
(0.606) 
_ -0.102 
(0.185) 
_ 
18 ≤ age < 21 -0.837 
(0.651) 
-0.943 
(0.680) 
-0.905 
(0.663) 
-1.163* 
(0.661) 
-0.265 
(0.210) 
-0.361 
(0.258) 
21 ≤ age < 22 -0.874 
(0.516) 
-0.944* 
(0.472) 
-0.991* 
(0.483) 
-0.935* 
(0.497) 
-0.311* 
(0.164) 
-0.373* 
(0.208) 
Age at offense 
(‘x’) 
-0.219 
(0.183) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
r  
[P(LR of r = 0)] 
_ 0.764** 
[0.023] 
0.698** 
[0.032] 
0.744* 
[0.054] 
0.488** 
[0.030] 
0.532** 
[0.046] 
r   _ _ _ _ 0.211** 
(0.071) 
0.236* 
(0.096) 
P(LR-Test) 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.009 
Nobs. 159 159 159 78 159 78 
 18
Table 4: (Continued) 
Notes: Joint ML estimates of two-equation models (1) and (2). Part II represents eq. (2). Clustered standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. P(LR-Test) indicates the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis 
r=0. Marginal Effects of binary variables w are calculated as ( | 1, 1, , )E ER T w x z  ( | 1, 0, , )E ER T w x z   ; 
corresponding standard errors are obtained using the delta method. Data: See Tables 1 and A3.  
 
Age at offense is expected to be insignificant because this variable is not directly related to 
expected recidivism when age of inmates (at the time of the interview) is already controlled 
for. As descriptive statistics revealed some nonlinear pattern of the influence of age (see also 
Table 2, Table 3), it is captured using dummies for age intervals. Inmates included in the 
regression were between 16 and 29 years old when they were interviewed (see Table 1). In 
Table 4, the (omitted) reference group is 22 years of age or older. There seem to be age-
dependent moods of inmates which can be characterized as increasingly optimistic until the 
age of 21 and more pessimistic when getting older than 21 years of age. In order to exclude 
potential age-dependent nuisance, age dummies are retained throughout all specifications 
despite their lack of strong statistical significance.  
 Conviction under Adult Criminal Law 
 
(1’) 
Single 
Probit  
Part II of two-equation models 
(2) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
(3) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
(4) 
Bivariate 
Probit 
(5) 
Treatment 
Regression 
 
(6) 
Treatment 
Regression 
 
Marginal 
effects (on 
recidivism) 
Criminal 
family 
background 
0.585* 
(0.308) 
0.330 
(0.263) 
_ 0.596* 
(0.283) 
_ _ _ 
Poor social 
capital 
0.589 
(0.383) 
0.603 
(0.385) 
_ 0.641* 
(0.349) 
_ _ _ 
No church  0.428 
(0.454) 
0.374 
(0.448) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
Schooling _ 0.056 
(0.055) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
Abitur 1.584** 
(0.583) 
_ 1.398** 
(0.619) 
1.405** 
(0.522) 
1.433** 
(0.623) 
1.250* 
(0.716) 
-0.207*** 
(0.072) 
Age at offense 
(‘x’) 
1.081*** 
(0.268) 
1.439*** 
(0.246) 
1.419*** 
(0.250) 
1.170*** 
(0.252) 
1.414*** 
(0.237) 
1.144*** 
(0.246) 
-0.213*** 
(0.082) 
Short sentence 
(< 2 years) 
0.577 
(0.438) 
0.198 
(0.526) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
Assault 0.040 
(0.392) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
Sexual offense 0.073 
(0.909) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
Theft -0.342 
(0.574) 
-0.750* 
(0.431) 
-0.487 
(0.355) 
-0.453 
(0.510) 
-0.461 
(0.384) 
-0.404 
(0.500) 
0.076 
(0.106) 
Robbery -0.868 
(0.533) 
-0.957** 
(0.348) 
-0.753** 
(0.314) 
-0.867** 
(0.367) 
-0.723** 
(0.319) 
-0.746* 
(0.361) 
0.142** 
(0.064) 
Illicit drug use -0.812 
(0.641) 
-0.621 
(0.586) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
P(LR-Test) 0.000 (see equation on expected recidivism) 
 Nobs. 78 
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The idea behind the assignment of explanatory variables to the selection and the treatment 
equations is to discriminate between the individual personal situation at the time of 
committing the offense (reconstructing the court’s information), and the situation prevailing at 
the time of the interview. Among the relevant data leading to informed decisions of judges, 
the type of crime, the degree of maturity and the social situation of defendants should play a 
role. Turning to estimated equations analyzing the probability of being treated under adult 
criminal law (Table 4, panel II), results are strongly in line with Figure 1 and confirm the 
crucial role of age at the moment of committing the crime in question (age at offense). 
Moreover, a higher degree of education, ‘Abitur’11, increases the probability of being treated 
as adult.12 These results suggest that judges not only consider age but also intellectual 
maturity as indicators of culpability in the sense of the adult criminal law. Besides these 
factors, criminal family background and poor social capital seem to have some (weak) 
relevance for deciding in favor of adult criminal law, possibly because both variables are 
positively related to unobserved factors such as lack of moral norms, lack of insight in 
wrongdoing or lack of compliance - all reflecting judges’ lack of confidence in future law-
abiding behavior. As regards types of crimes, robbery is clearly treated under juvenile crime. 
Thieves, too, have a higher probability of being convicted as a juvenile, but to a lesser and 
mostly insignificant extent. Vandalism had to be excluded from the analysis, because, with 
few exceptions, all cases were treated under juvenile law such that probit achieved perfect 
predictions of endogenous outcomes. In Table 4, the most severe crimes, murder and sexual 
offense, are not included in most specifications such that these categories always belong to the 
reference group (note, however, that inmates can serve for more than one crime). The same 
holds for drug dealing. Several specifications experimenting with the severity of sanctions 
show no significant result. Table 4, column (1) presents a model that includes the impact of 
‘short’ prison terms which is found to be positive (but insignificant). As already observed for 
expected recidivism, religious affiliation has no significant effect on being treated either as 
adult or as juvenile.  
The main focus is on the identification of the causal effect of treatment under ‘adult’ 
conditions. The structural parameters of interest capturing the threshold effect between 
juvenile and non-juvenile law ( 1 ) and the effect of adult criminal law ( 2 ) are both 
                                                 
 
11 ‘Abitur’ is the general qualification for university admission in Germany; it is equivalent to the American 
high-school diploma, the French ‘baccalauréat’ and the British ‘A level’. 
12 Alternative specifications using years of education lead to the same conclusions, but schooling turned out to be 
only weakly significant in most specifications such that the degree ‘Abitur’ was used instead. 
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insignificant in single equation probit models.  However, the single-equation model of 
recidivism is affected by some ‘omitted variable bias’ in the sense that the unobserved factor 
e  in the recidivism equation (1) is correlated with unmeasured random determinants captured 
by  in the assignment equation (2). As described in detail in the previous Section, ML 
estimations of two-equation models presented in column (2) to (6) of Table 4 take this 
correlation into account. All results, irrespective of estimation method and model 
specification, indicate a high and positive correlation coefficient r. Likelihood-ratio tests show 
significance at the 5% level (p-values range between 0.023 and 0.054). The positive 
correlation confirms the presumption that adverse but unobserved common factors such as 
obvious criminal energy and persistence of unreasonable and unteachable attitudes which lead 
judges to rule under criminal law cause higher expected recidivism rates.  
All two-equation models indicate that the parameter 2 on application of general criminal law 
is negative and significant at the 5% level (see models (2) to (5) of Table 4) or at the 10% 
level in model (6). These estimates indicate that application of criminal law instead of 
juvenile law decreases expected recidivism. This result is in line with the hypothesis that 
treatment under the stricter adult law entails some deterrent effect such that inmates intend to 
avoid future imprisonment under adult conditions. The alternative explanation is that prisoner 
rehabilitation and corrective measures are more effective under adult law than under juvenile 
law. However, the latter view seems to be rather unlikely given the fact that costs per juvenile 
prisoner exceed those of adult prisoners by about 40 to 50% which is mainly due to a much 
higher ratio of personnel per inmate.13  
The positive estimate of 1 , i.e. the parameter which represents the overall shift from ‘pure’ 
juvenile law to a discretionary regime of juvenile and adult law, reveals a smaller but 
significant upward shift of expected recidivism after turning 18.14 Thus, those being older 
than 18 years of age seem to be less deterred by the mixed regime than those below the 
threshold of 18 years of age who are strictly treated as juveniles. Again, two interpretations 
are in order. The first one is that the threat of a weighted risk of juvenile law and adult law 
increases the inclination to commit future crimes, possibly because inmates know that their 
personal risk of being affected by adult law is relatively low and because juvenile custody is 
                                                 
 
13 A survey among the management of German prisons (Entorf et al. 2008, p.144) revealed that the average 
number of employees per 100 adult inmates amounted to 50 people, whereas the manpower invested for 
supervision and rehabilitation of 100 juvenile inmates was 71 persons.  
14 Of course, this effect has to be interpreted as the average effect of all ages exceeding 18, i.e. it is different from 
the local effect one would get from a RD design.  
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considered not as bad by (criminally experienced) young adults older than 18 years than by 
‘true’ juveniles of, say, 16 or 17 years of age.  The second interpretation is that rehabilitation 
measures are less effective for adolescent offenders. 
Looking at bivariate probit results in more detail (Table 4, columns (2) to (4)),  we observe 
that estimates do not change much when we reduce the age-at-offence window from (15, 22] 
to [18,21) (such that 1  cannot be identified). In the recidivism equation, only job contact 
loses significance, whereas criminal family background and poor social capital even gain 
significance in the assignment equation.  
Table 4, columns (5) and (6), show estimates for the treatment approach. Specifications differ 
somewhat from the bivariate probit because inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in the equation 
of interest requires some stricter consideration of the exclusion restriction. Hence only age at 
offence (as general indicator of maturity),  ‘Abitur’ (representing intellectual maturity) and 
type of offence are used as exogenous factors which are supposed to be of crucial importance 
for selecting adolescents into either juvenile or adult law, whereas the significance of all 
remaining variables is tested within the treatment equation. Signs and significance levels of 
the larger sample do not differ from the ones of bivariate probit (compare columns (5) to (3)), 
whereas for the smaller sample estimates of the treatment regression are somewhat less 
significant than those of bivariate probit (see columns (4) and (6)). The high significance of 
the correlation coefficient r is confirmed. Moreover, r  is positive and significant (although 
only at the 10% level in the smaller sample) such that omitting the inverse Mills ratio from the 
treatment equation would lead to an omitted variable bias.  
The last column in the assignment equation shows marginal effects of exogenous factors on 
expected recidivism (note that the treatment regression is based on the linear probability 
models such that estimated parameters are identical to marginal effects). These marginal 
effects are calculated under the restriction that the selection decision is T=1, i.e., e.g., for the 
dichotomous variable Abitur it reads ( | 1, 1, , ) ( | 1, 0, , )E ER T Abi x z E ER T Abi x z     . 
Marginal effects have opposite signs.  This is quite reasonable as can be seen from age at 
offense or Abitur: Higher maturity increases the probability of being treated as adult which, 
however, implies that after being selected to such ‘adult’ conditions adolescents show lower 
recidivism rates.  
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses the issue of appropriate treatment of young adult offenders. In particular, 
it is an open question whether they should be treated under juvenile law (with strong emphasis 
on educational and correctional measures), or under application of the more severe adult 
criminal law. However, when comparing recidivism rates of both groups, most of the existing 
surveys studies introduce selection biases that prevent a true comparison of individuals with 
and without the ‘adult’ treatment. A major problem is that many studies do not control for 
pre-existing conditions that may then affect the outcomes.  
This paper contributes to the literature on specific deterrence in several ways: First, the study 
based on the German legal system (which is similar to the one in several other European 
countries) provides some external evidence to the prevailing literature which is based on the 
U.S. paradigm, where the line of adulthood is at some younger ages. Second, unlike the 
situation in the U.S. and in most other countries, turning a critical age cutoff (which is 18 in 
Germany) does not automatically imply application of the ‘adult’ law. Instead there is a 
smooth transition to a fuzzy design of either adult or juvenile legislation. The selection is 
subject to discretionary court decisions, which depend on the severity of the crime and the 
personal development of the defendant. This particular situation requires an innovative 
research design. Application of (fuzzy) regression discontinuity seems to be straightforward. 
However, the cutoff is hardly noticeable at the age of 18 which limits the usual advantages of 
RD. Thus, maximum likelihood estimations of a joint two-equation system (selection and 
treatment equations) have been performed in order to identify the causal effect of the ‘adult’ 
treatment, thereby controlling for the selectivity into ‘adult’ and ‘juvenile’ regimes.  
Results suggest that inmates of the adolescent age group [18,21) convicted under adult 
criminal law have a lower propensity for future offending. Alcohol and drug addiction, low 
social capital, criminal family background and bad labor market perspectives belong to the 
most important factors driving expected recidivism. Inspecting the court decisions in favor of 
adult criminal law, robbery is most likely treated under juvenile law and intellectual and 
moral development of defendants seem to be best proxied by age and educational degree 
(‘Abitur’). 
Results are in line with the hypothesis that treatment under the stricter adult criminal law has 
some specific deterrent effect such that inmates intend to avoid future imprisonment under 
such conditions. Of course, results would also be consistent with the alternative explanation 
that prisoner rehabilitation and corrective measures prescribed for adolescents are less 
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effective under juvenile law. This interpretation, however, would suggest highly inefficient 
measures of social integration as costs per juvenile inmate exceed those of adult criminals by 
more than 40% (Entorf et al. 2008).  
There are some limitations of this study which could only be derestricted when large-scale 
individual panel data sets on recidivism were available in Germany. Unfortunately, there is no 
publicly available source which collects individual information on recidivism and its 
background factors of the German prison population. The only official source is Jehle et al. 
(2003) which provides aggregate statistics of recidivism realized during the short period 1994 
to 1998.15 Thus, even though the number of observations is rather small and data on 
recidivism are based on self assessment, the present study offers a rare evaluation of factors 
leading judges to convict defendants under adult criminal law (instead of juvenile law), 
thereby allowing for testing the specific deterrence hypothesis for adolescent offenders. It is 
hoped that the study will encourage more research dealing with the problem of selection and 
recidivism, particularly in European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15 Recidivism statistics do not provide further information on factors of recidivism. Even information on state-
dependent recidivism rates is withheld by the German Government for political reasons: see the statement made 
by the Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz, Bonn) in a newspaper article (see FAZ, July 16th, 2010).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics:  Total sample  
Variable  Nobs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
recidivism (expectation) 859 .2188591 .4137138 0 1 
age at offense 837 31.75876 10.85896 15.3 65.5 
age 859 35.13853 11.61426 16 68 
male 859 .8824214 .3222961 0 1 
married 859 .1734575 .3788629 0 1 
poor social capital 859 .5552969 .4972224 0 1 
no church  859 .2735739 .4460525 0 1 
criminal family background 859 .1699651 .3758209 0 1 
village 859 .2188591 .4137138 0 1 
addiction (alcohol or drugs) 859 .2805588 .449534 0 1 
good job market prospect 859 .2060536 .404705 0 1 
schooling 847 10.34475 2.170845 2 24 
length of prison sentence  838 4.449165 3.639345 .11 19 
adult 859 .8719441 .3343467 0 1 
murder 859 .112922 .3166818 0 1 
sexual offence 859 .1233993 .3290866 0 1 
assault 859 .1897555 .392336 0 1 
robbery 859 .1559953 .3630623 0 1 
theft 859 .233993 .4236144 0 1 
fraud 859 .2153667 .411316 0 1 
illicit drugs: consumption 859 .0698487 .2550403 0 1 
illicit drugs: dealing 859 .1408615 .3480813 0 1 
vandalism 859 .0232829 .1508884 0 1 
Note: descriptive statistics under the restriction that variables show valid observations on ‘recidivism’; Source: 
German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al, 2008) 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics, age at offence = (15, 18), juvenile penal law 
Variable  Nobs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
recidivism (expectation) 55 0.2909091 0.4583678 0 1
age at offense 55 16.85832 0.8070685 15.3 17.9
age 55 18.85455 1.393346 16 23
male 55 1 0 1 1
married 55 0.0181818 0.13484 0 1
poor social capital 55 0.4727273 0.5038572 0 1
no church  55 0.3454545 0.479899 0 1
criminal family background 55 0.2181818 0.4168182 0 1
village 55 0.1272727 0.33635 0 1
addiction (alcohol or drugs) 55 0.2727273 0.4494666 0 1
job contact 55 0.2181818 0.4168182 0 1
schooling 55 9.290909 1.565516 4 12
length (of prison sentence)  55 2.907576 2.141933 0.5 9.5
(application of) criminal law 55 0 0 0 0
murder 55 0.1272727 0.33635 0 1
sexual offence 55 0.0363636 0.1889186 0 1
assault 55 0.4909091 0.504525 0 1
robbery 55 0.4363636 0.5005048 0 1
theft 55 0.5636364 0.5005048 0 1
fraud 55 0.1090909 0.3146266 0 1
illicit drugs: consumption 55 0.0363636 0.1889186 0 1
illicit drugs: dealing 55 0.1272727 0.33635 0 1
vandalism 55 0.1636364 0.373355 0 1
Note: descriptive statistics under the restriction that variables show valid observations on ‘recidivism’; Source: 
German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al, 2008) 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics, age at offence = [18, 21), young adults (juvenile or adult law) 
Variable  Nobs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
recidivism (expectation) 78 0.3205128 0.4696943 0 1
age at offense 78 19.64153 0.9005078 18 20.9
age 78 21.79487 2.188274 19 29
male 78 0.9358974 0.2465209 0 1
married 78 0.1025641 0.3053524 0 1
poor social capital 78 0.4487179 0.5005824 0 1
no church  78 0.3717949 0.4864121 0 1
criminal family background 78 0.2692308 0.4464311 0 1
village 78 0.1538462 0.3631365 0 1
addiction (alcohol or drugs) 78 0.2948718 0.4589365 0 1
good job market prospect 78 0.1923077 0.3966644 0 1
schooling 78 10.03846 2.263157 3 17
length of prison sentence  76 3.192982 2.758563 0.3 15
application of criminal law 78 0.2820513 0.4529108 0 1
murder 78 0.1282051 0.336482 0 1
sexual offence 78 0.0384615 0.1935524 0 1
assault 78 0.3974359 0.492535 0 1
robbery 78 0.2948718 0.4589365 0 1
theft 78 0.3333333 0.4744557 0 1
fraud 78 0.2179487 0.4155246 0 1
illicit drugs: consumption 78 0.0897436 0.287664 0 1
illicit drugs: dealing 78 0.1410256 0.3503008 0 1
vandalism 78 0.1282051 0.336482 0 1
Note: descriptive statistics under the restriction that variables show valid observations on ‘recidivism’; Source: 
German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al, 2008) 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics, age at offence = [21, 22], adult criminal law 
Variable  Nobs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
recidivism (expectation) 26 0.1923077 0.4019185 0 1
age at offense 26 21.54961 0.2781412 21 22
age 26 24.30769 1.783687 22 29
male 26 0.7692308 0.4296689 0 1
married 26 0.1538462 0.3679465 0 1
poor social capital 26 0.6153846 0.4961389 0 1
no church  26 0.2307692 0.4296689 0 1
criminal family background 26 0.0769231 0.2717465 0 1
village 26 0.3076923 0.4706787 0 1
addiction (alcohol or drugs) 26 0.3076923 0.4706787 0 1
good job market prospect 26 0.1538462 0.3679465 0 1
schooling 26 10.38462 2.401282 2 15
length of prison sentence  26 3.645833 3.224715 0.2 14
application of criminal law 26 1 0 1 1
murder 26 0.0769231 0.2717465 0 1
sexual offence 26 0.1153846 0.3258126 0 1
assault 26 0.1153846 0.3258126 0 1
robbery 26 0.1153846 0.3258126 0 1
theft 26 0.3461538 0.4851645 0 1
fraud 26 0.2307692 0.4296689 0 1
illicit drugs: consumption 26 0.1153846 0.3258126 0 1
illicit drugs: dealing 26 0.1538462 0.3679465 0 1
vandalism 26 0 0 0 0
Note: descriptive statistics under the restriction that variables show valid observations on ‘recidivism’; Source: 
German Inmate Survey (Entorf et al, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
